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CREATION AS THEODICY: 
IN DEFENSE OF A KABBALISTIC 
APPROACH TO EVIL 
Robert Oakes 
The doctrine of Tzimzum (or divine "withdrawal") occupies pride of place in 
the Jewish mystical tradition as a response to what is arguably the chief theo-
logical or metaphysical concern of that tradition: namely, how God's Infinity 
or Absolute Unlimitedness does not preclude the existence of a distinct 
domain of finite being. Alternatively, how can it be that God, by virtue of His 
Maximal Plenteousness, does not exhaust the whole of Reality? I attempt to 
show that, while a plausible argument - one that does not involve the idea of 
Tzimzum - can be mounted against this "pantheism" problem, the doctrine 
of Tzimzum has considerable force as the nucleus of a theodicy. 
In this essay I shall present in some expository depth, and reflect philo-
sophically upon, an audacious and beguiling theory concerning what 
God Must do in order to Create which has long enjoyed considerable 
esteem and influence in the Jewish esoteric or mystical tradition 
("Kabbalah"). Indeed, it is a theory that has occupied nothing less than 
center-stage within the intricate "theosophical" scheme of the great six-
teenth-century Kabbalist Rabbi Issac Luria. The thesis I hope to secure is 
that the doctrine in question displays some very impressive-if as yet 
philosophically unheralded-strength as the nucleus of a theodicy. 
It would be well to clarify, however, that it is not my intention to 
engage in theodicy here in the strong or classical sense. While it seems to 
me that the explanation of evil' afforded by the Lurianic doctrine in 
question has the serious prospect of hitting the nail on the head, i.e., of 
being the actual reason for the existence of evil, no attempt will be made 
in the sequel to vindicate quite that bold a claim. It should not be 
inferred from this, however, that my purpose is simply to secure one 
more "defense" for evil (in Plantinga's sense); i.e., one more "explana-
tion" designed to refute the time-honored but by now fairly disreputable 
notion that the existence of God is conceptually incompatible with the 
existence of evil-or at least with all of the evil that actually exists. 
Hence, the thesis that I shall defend is a bit more fleshy than the claim 
that the explanation of evil to be elaborated is one for which there is con-
ceptual space within the metaphysics of theism. Rather, I shall contend 
that the relevant Lurianic theory can properly be held to constitute the 
core of a plausible (or respectable) explanation of evil. As will be discussed 
later on in some detail, my central justification for maintaining this is 
that the theodicy rooted in Rabbi Luria's doctrine- notwithstanding an 
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ostensibly problematic aspect of it (to be spelled out at the tail end of 
these deliberations)- possesses explanatory virtues that are not readily 
found in more standard (or less "mystical") theodicies. First, however, 
some important background concerning the impetus for, and nature of, 
the Lurianic "theosophical" doctrine in question. 
II 
To begin with, Rabbi Luria's account does not seem to have been 
designed primarily with theodicy in mind. Rather, it was fundamentally 
intended as a response to what is arguably the chief metaphysical or the-
ological concern of the Jewish mystical tradition2-a concern which can 
suitably be expressed by the following question(s): how is it that God, as 
the Being or Substance Who is necessarily limitless in all respects, man-
ages to create a domain of contingent being (the natural universe or cos-
mos) which is-in some entirely proper sense-metaphysically distinct 
from Him? Alternatively, since God's absolute unlimitedness cannot but 
ensure that He is infinitely plenteous, how can there possibly exist finite 
or created objects which do not ultimately reduce to mere aspects of 
Him? How can there be metaphysical room' a domain of existents distinct 
from God's limitless Being? Alternatively, could it seriously be denied 
that the Divine Substance must be ontologically exhaustive? Rather, 
does not consistency demand, as would come to be held by Spinoza and 
Spinozists, that God must be all-inclusive, and, accordingly, that every 
constituent or element of the domain of "Nature" must ultimately 
reduce to a mere aspect or (following Spinoza) mode of God; i.e, reduce 
to one of the ways that God is? In sum, while it is central to classical the-
ism (hence to classical Judaism) that the conception of God as absolutely 
limitless does not metaphysically eventuate in Spinozistic pantheism, 
how can classical theists justifiably deny that God does not exhaust the 
whole of Reality?4 
Intriguingly, it has been central to canonical theism that God, while 
clearly transcending the natural order that He creates and sustains, is 
nonetheless immanent in His Creation. Indeed, the tradition has stan-
dardly maintained that God is pervasively immanent (omnipresent) in 
the spatiotemporal order. This notwithstanding, however, traditional 
theism has resolutely insisted that pervasive immanence does not entail 
(what might aptly be called) exhaustive immanence; i.e. God's being such 
that "there is no place empty of Him'" is not to be taken to imply that 
God incorporates all of the being that there is. To sharpen further the 
notion of exhaustive immanence, consider the difference between the 
aesthetic creations of a painter and those of a dancer." To begin with, 
while the painter can go off and leave her work behind, the dancer clear-
ly cannot. Rather, the aesthetic product which constitutes the dance-per-
formance could not conceivably exhibit temporal extension without 
being conserved through the applicable time-span by the relevant 
dancer. In just this respect, then, the relation between God and the cos-
mos shares an important feature with the relation that obtains between 
the dancer and the dance. For it is central to normative theism that the 
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cosmos could not conceivably exhibit temporal extension minus the 
exercise of God's conserving power. 
This parallel between God-and-cosmos and dancer-and-dance, how-
ever, is quickly overshadowed by a central dissimilarity. For God's per-
vasive immanence in the cosmos (on, of course, the canonical account) is 
not nearly as radical as the immanence of the dancer in the dance. That 
is, unlike the case of the painter and the painting, the dance enjoys no 
real or metaphysical distinctness from the dancer; rather, the dance just 
is-is fully constituted by-the (aesthetically stylized) motion of the 
dancer. 
Alternatively, the dancer-in-appropriate-motion exhausts the dance-
performance; the dance simply reduces to-is nothing more than-the 
dancer-in-appropriate-motion. Accordingly, the issue which the 
Lurianic theory concerning Divine Creation was designed to resolve can 
with propriety be rendered as follows: while traditional theists unequiv-
ocally reject the notion that the exhaustive immanence of the dancer in 
the dance constitutes an accurate model of God's immanence in the 
world, how-in light of its conception of God as absolutely limitless-
are they rationally entitled to that rejection? How could spinoza and 
friends possibly be wrong in holding that, by virtue of God's Infinity, 
the Divine Substance and its modes "form the sum total of existence?"7 
III 
Rabbi Luria's bold and mythically powerful attempt to overcome this 
putative difficulty relies heavily upon the concept of Tzimizum, which 
can properly be translated as "withdrawl" or "retreat." The basic idea is 
this: in order to make "metaphysical room" for the existence of the 
world, God brings about (as it were) a "self-contraction:" a constriction 
of the infinite plenteousness of His Being to the extent that would allow 
for His creation (or, as R. Luria would seem to prefer, Emanation) of a 
natural universe, which, while radically dependent upon God for its 
continuity, enjoys (as opposed to the case of the dance and the dancer) 
some measure of "separateness" from God. Engaging for the moment in 
a bit of naive or anthropocentric picture-thinking, imagine God "inhal-
ing deeply" or "sucking in His chest" and just holding it there in order 
to allow for His Creation of a distinct domain of contingent being. 
How should we assess this theory? To begin with, it is apparent that 
the doctrine of Tzimizum cannot be taken in a straightforwardly meta-
physical or literal sense. Moreover, it seems evident that it was never 
intended to be taken in that way. As stated by Rabbi Schneur Zalman, 
one of the giants of Jewish mysticism (whom we will have occasion to 
revisit): " .. .it is totally impossible to take the doctrine of the constriction 
literally ... "~ It is, of course, easy to see why. As the sages of the tradition 
well understood (without, of course, expressing the point in the vocabu-
lary of contemporary modal logic), no individual could have the 
"power" to divest itself of any property which it possesses essentially. 
Alternatively, properties possessed essentially are possessed immutably. 
Hence, since omnipotence clearly does not include the possession of 
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conceptually impossible powers, God does not possess the "power" to 
divest Himself of (or in any way modify) His limitlessness or infinite 
plenteousness. Thus, the Lurianic doctrine of Tzimizum-when literally 
interpreted-cannot possibly constitute a true account of how an 
absolutely unlimited Being could fail to be ontologically exhaustive. 
IV 
Before moving center-stage into an elaboration of the deeper interpre-
tation of Tzimzum and its intriguing relevance to theodicy, I want to take 
just a brief interlude to suggest that there is a straightforwardly philo-
sophical (or Tzimizum-independent) resolution to this time-honored 
and-or so it seems to me-overstated "pantheism" problem. specifical-
ly, I think it can be shown that there is strong analogical justification for 
holding that an unlimited Being need not be regarded as ontologically 
exhaustive. Consider: it is axiomatic that God could not fail to possess 
maximal or unlimited power; i.e., that God possesses all of the power 
that could possibly be possessed by a single individual. (Spelling out the 
entailments of this in some rigorous fashion remains, of course, a matter 
of controversy.) However, this has never been seriously taken to 
imply-even by those who embrace (some version of) occasionalism'o-
that God exhausts every last bit of power there can be. To the contrary, 
however omnipotence is to be unpacked, it has long been recognized to 
include the power to delegate suitable power to creatures. Precisely the 
same principle obtains, of course, regarding maximal knowledge (omni-
science). To be omniscient is to have all of the knowledge that a single 
individual could possibly possess: it does not mean (or imply) that 
God's knowledge must exhaust all of the knowledge there can be. If that 
were the case, all finite persons-as beings putatively distinct from 
God-would be saddled with total ignorance. Clearly, this would be a 
patently absurd construal of Divine Omnsicience. 
Now it seems to me that the foregoing observations provide us with 
more than ample justification for rejecting the Spinozist conviction (or 
"intuition") that God's maximal or unlimited plenteousness entails His 
exhaustion of all being; i.e., that God is ultimately (in the "final analysis") 
the only Existent.12 For since, as just discussed, it is perfectly proper to 
deny that God's maximal power and maximal knowledge entail that He 
has a monopoly on power and knowledge, why is it not perfectly proper 
to deny that God's maximal or unlimited plenteousness has the (pantheis-
tic) implication that God has a monopoly on being? Rather, that God is 
maximally plenteous can properly be taken to mean that the Substance 
Who is God possesses the highest degree of plenteousness or being13 that 
could possibly be possessed by a single individual; nothing else could 
possibly approximate (let alone match) the plenteousness enjoyed by 
God. But that, of course, hardly imples that God relates to the cosmos as 
the dancer relates to the dance; i.e., that (in the"final analysis") nothing is 
metaphysically distinct from the maximally plenteous Substance Who is 
God. Accordingly, it seems entirely in order to conclude that classical or 
Spinozistic pantheism is not an entailment of God's unlimited or infinite 
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plenteousness. Of course, since analogical reasoning is structurally non-
probative or or nondefinitive, the foregoing argument fails to guarantee 
the truth of its conclusion. This notwithstanding, however, it can still 
constitute (as I believe it does) strong warrant for holding that contingent 
or created objects are metaphysically distinct from the maximally plen-
teous Being Who created and sustains them. Moreover, there is much to 
suggest that the nonprobative character of our argument is not simply a 
function of its analogical structure; i.e., it may also have much to do with 
the inherently philosophical (or metaphysical) nature of its conclusion. 
For it may well be that there are no arguments with philosophically inter-
esting conclusions (as, to take the present case, Maximal plenteousness does 
/lot entail ontological exhaustiveness)-be they even deductively rigorous 
and sound-which are probative or definitive in the sense that anyone 
who accepted the premisses of such an argument but rejected its conclu-
sion would be irrational or intellectually perverse." If so, then, since our 
argument both has a philosophically interesting conclusion and is analog-
ical in structure, that it is nonprobative may well be "overdetermined." 
However, none of this vitiates an assessment of the argument as consti-
tuting an eminently plausible case for its conclusion; i.e., as providing a 
strong analogical foundation for holding that God's maximal plenteous-
ness does not require His exhaustion of reality. 
v 
Rabbi Schneur Zalman, the founder of Chabad Chasidism,15 suggests 
an intriguing analogy as a clue to interpreting the real meaning of the 
doctrine of Tzimzum. The construal in question in no way implies-in 
contradistinction to the literalist understanding of the doctrine-the 
impossible: namely, that God's infinite plenitude can in some way be 
lessened or diminished. Rabbi Zalman asks us to consider the case of a 
teacher who needs to present some rather complex or difficult idea to 
her students. Since the class could not begin to grasp the relevant idea at 
the teacher's plane of comprehension, she needs to "reduce" the concept 
to a level at which it can be properly grasped by her students without 
sacrificing any of its core content. (The sort of daunting challenge with 
which teachers are regularly faced.) Alternatively, the students would 
clearly be intellectively overwhelmed if the idea were to be presented at 
something like conceptual full-throttle. Hence, the teacher needs to 
"descend" (as it were) to the comprehension-level of the students. While 
she reveals for the benefit of her students, she also needs to conceal for 
their benefit: alternatively, in order to convey the concept effectively, 
some intellectual braking-some tzimzum-is required. 
According to Rabbi zalman, this analogy provides us with the requi-
site conceptual foothold for grasping the real or deep significance of the 
Divine Tzimzum undertaken by God. vis-a-vis His Creation: namely, 
God's concealing or severely restraining the full intensity of His infinite 
or unlimited Radiance. Such Divine restraint is required to ensure that 
the finite or limited beings produced by God are able to subsist or sur-
vive as such. That is, if God were to reveal the full intensity of His limit-
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less Radiance, finite being- hence human persons-could not but be 
nullified or consumed by that Radiance.1" Alternatively, no finite existent 
could possibly survive intact-could possibly withstand or endure- a 
full-intensity revelation of God's Spiritual Power. Intriguingly, and as 
readily confirmed, there is serious Scriptural support for this idea. In 
Exodus 33:18, Moses makes the following request of God: "Show me 
now Your glory." Here is how God (in part) responds: "You will not be 
able to see My face, for man shall not see Me and live" (Exodus: 33:20). 
Then, just a bit further on (Exodus: 22-23), God states: 
" ... While my glory pas seth by ... 1 will put thee in a cleft of the rock, 
and will cover thee with My hand until I have passed by. And I 
will take away My hand, and thou shalt see my back; but My face 
may not be seen." 
Hence, there is just so much of the Divine Holiness that human persons 
have the capacity to sustain. Anything stronger than this would ensure 
their annihilation or nullification as individuals metaphysically distinct 
from God. 
This theme surfaces often in many central Jewish sources and among 
many seminal Jewish thinkers. As observed by the great medieval 
philosopher and Biblical exegete Levi Ben Gerson (Gersonides) in his 
commentary on Deut. 4:33 ("Has a people ever heard the voice of God 
speaking from the midst of the fire as you have heard, and survived?"): 
A human being could not live after experiencing a degree of reve-
lation that was far above his spiritual capacity [much as a person 
can be blinded by a sudden flash of light]. Even Jacob thought him-
self fortunate to survive an encounter with an angel-yet the entire 
nation of Israel heard the voice of God and remained aliveY 
Nonetheless, as noted by the distinguished (late) Rabbi Aryeh Kaplan: 
... the first reaction at Sinai was one of shock. The people could not 
endure the majesty of God's word, and our sages teach us that 
their souls literally left them. Their reaction is expressed in the 
Biblical account of sinai where immediately afterward they told 
Moses (Ex.20:l6), "You speak to us and we will listen, but let not 
God speak with us any more, for we will dieY 
Moses' remarkable level of holiness ensured that he was uniquely suited 
to receive God's word. This notwithstanding, and as noted just above, 
even he-as a finite being-could not have absorbed God's full or com-
plete Glory: (" ... My face may not be seen"). 
Accordingly, the Jewish mystical tradition has insisted that some 
"veiling" of the Divine Countenance-some "hiding of the face" (as it 
were), i.e., Hester Panim-is required so that the Divine Light" ... shall not 
manifest itself in a greater radiance than the lower worlds are capable of receiv-
ing." IY Here, then, we have the proper or authoritative interpretation of 
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the doctrine of Tzimzum. Just as sunscreen on exposed skin is needed to 
protect us from what would be the harmful effects-at a certain level of 
intensity-of the rays of the sun, one can properly (albeit metaphorical-
ly) view the Divine Tzimzum as God's "protective sunscreen." As 
admirably encapsulated by the contemporary expositor and representa-
tive of the the mystical tradition Rabbi Adin Steinsaltz, "The basic idea is 
that the infinite light cannot reveal itself as it is in [or to) the finite, for 
the finite could not possibly contain it."20 
VI 
The question of moment, then, is surely the following: what does all 
of this have to do with theodicy? Alternatively, what connection is there 
between the doctrine of Tzimzum (properly interpreted) and the exis-
tence of evil or unmerited suffering? Well, the the notion that I shall go 
on to defend is this: the Divine Tzimzum requisite for Divine Creation 
comes at a serious metaphysical price; namely, an unavoidable by-prod-
uct of the "veiling" of the Divine Countenance (Radiance, Holiness) to 
the extent required for finite being to survive intact-for it not to be 
absorbed or consumed by the Infinite-is a serious potential for unmer-
ited suffering. For the revelatory depth of Divine Radiance or Holiness 
necessary to cure the world of such evil could not but result in the eradi-
cation of the finite as a distinct domain of being. Here is an analogy: the 
intensity of gamma radiation that it would take to cure patient X of his 
pathology would clearly result in his death. 
At the heart of this theodicy, then, is the principle that the depth to 
which goodness and justice manage to prevail within the domain of the 
created or the finite is a function of-if not just extensionally one with-
the depth to which the power of God's Holiness or Radiance is manifest-
ed within Creation. Hence, since there must be some concealment of this 
Radiance-some Hester Panim or Tzimzum-to ensure the existence and 
perdurance of the finite, goodness and justice do not always prevail,Zl 
Alternatively, because nothing short of Divine Tzimzum could begin to 
guarantee the survival intact of the domain of created being, God's 
providential governance of the cosmos cannot fully ensure against 
unmerited suffering; i.e. against the sort of suffering starkly dramatized 
by the Book of Job. Accordingly, 
... the root of evil ultimately lies in the very nature of Creation 
itself...because of its nature as Creation-i.e., as other than 
Godhead- an element of imbalance, defectiveness and darkness 
must enter into every restricted existence ... the rigorous theistic 
[nonpwitheistic] tendency of Lurianic Kabbalah ... requires evil as a 
factor necessarily inherent in Creation per se, without which 
Creation would instantly lose its separate existence and return to 
being absorbed in the Infinite.22 
Hence, our theodicy can be encapsulated as follows: since finite per-
sons (along with finite being in generaD- solely by virtue of their fini-
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tude-are constitutionally unable to withstand anything close to a full-
scale revelation of God's Infinite Radiance, Divine Creation requires 
Divine Tzimzum (or Hester Panim), i.e., some serious concealment of that 
Radiance. This, in turn, provides "metaphysical room" (as it were) for 
unmerited suffering. Accordingly, it seems clear that God has the requisite 
morally sufficient reason for permitting such suffering so long as He has a 
morally sufficient reason for undertaking Tzimzum. It is, however, indis-
putable-given the (intuitively secure) assumption that finite persons 
who can come to know God, love God, and center their lives in God con-
stitutes an enormous or surpassing good-that God does have a morally 
sufficient reason for undertaking Tzimzum: namely, the domain of created 
or finite being could not otherwise perdure. Hence, it seems to follow 
undeniably that God would have a morally sufficient reason for permit-
ting the unmerited suffering that at times befalls human persons by virtue 
of the Tzimzum which is required for them to exist and perdure as such. 
VII 
Does this theodicy have much to recommend it? I want to argue that 
the answer to this question is Yes. First off, it has no shortage of explana-
tory virtue: it accounts quite naturally for unmerited suffering in the 
sense that the occurrence of such suffering is not at all surprising if 
Divine Tzimzum is indeed a necessary condition for the existence and 
perdurance of the finite. Of arguably even greater significance, however, 
is that the theodicy under discussion copes remarkably well with the 
problem that goes to the very core of traditional theism's attempt to deal 
with the world's evil; i.e., what might suitably be called the 
"Manicheanism-vs.-Divine sovereignty" problem concerning the ulti-
mate source of evil. Intriguingly, it is the first issue taken up by Kant in 
his discussion of the problem of evil in his Lectures on Philosophical 
Theology. Here is his admirably eloquent elaboration of it:23 
Where does the evil in the world come from if the sole original 
source of everything is holy? This objection gains its strength pri-
marily through the consideration that nothing can arise without its 
first predisposition having been made by its creator. What, then? .. 
Because they were unable to make sense of this, it occurred to men 
long ago to assume a special evil original being, who had wrested a 
part of all things from the holy original source and impressed its 
own essence on that part. But this manicheanism conflicts with 
human reason ... What, then? Shall we derive evil from a holy 
God? 
Clearly, traditional theism could not begin to countenance any account 
of the ultimate source of evil (of whatever variety) that smacks of 
Manicheanism: any account which involved or made reference to an ulti-
mate (uncreated) malevolent force with sufficient power to test, chal-
lenge, or foil the sovereignty of God. Hence, the pressing and vexed 
question: how did evil ever find its way into a cosmos with the finite per-
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fection of being the directly willed product of a metaphysically and axio-
logically flawless Being Who is also the absolute or unrivalled sovereign 
of that cosmos?24 Unless God's absolute sovereignty is to be sacrificed, 
there would seem to be something less than fully acceptable or tenable 
about the prevalent view that, while God undoubtedly permits the occur-
rence of evil (for, presumably, a morally sufficient reason), there can be 
no proper sense in which He constitutes its source (or cause).2' Moreover, 
there is no shortage of passages in Scripture which call this view into 
question; e.g. "Shall evil befall a city, and the LORD hath not done it?" 
(Amos 3:6); "Out of the Most High proceedeth not Evil and good?" 
(Lamentations 3:38); "I form the light, and create darkness; I make peace, 
and create evil; I am the LORD, that doeth all these things." (Isaiah 45:7). 
This is not in any way to suggest, let it be clear, that God must be taken to 
ordain the existence of evil, i.e., that He produces evil in just the direct or 
intentional manner in which He produces the natural universe. Indeed, if-
as has been maintained by every theistic metaphysician with whose thought 
I am familiar-the inherent nature of evil consists in privatio bani, then, inso-
far as nothing ordained or intentionally produced by God can constitute pri-
vations of being or value-" ... He only produces being, and all being is a 
good"2h-evil cannot be directly willed by God. However, God does not 
have to intend the existence of evil in order for Manicheanism to be false. 
Rather, God can still be the ultimate source of evil in a purely extensional 
sense of "source," and it is hard not to see this as a serious virtue of the 
theodicy which has been elaborated. Specifically, the theodicy in question 
allows us to comfortably maintain that there is a perfectly proper sense in 
which God is the ultimate source of evil, though His causation of it is clearly 
(indirect or) unintentional. Rather, evil can properly be regarded as an unin-
tended by-product of the Divine Hester Panim or Tzimzum which is requisite 
to ensure that the domain of finite being which God has created and sustains 
is not annihilated, consumed, or nullified by (what would otherwise be) the 
intensity of a full-blown revelation of His limitless Spiritual Radiance. 
Hence, the theodicy in question would seem to have the remarkable 
virtue of accounting for the world's evil in a manner which is scrupulous-
ly non-Manichean without in any way embracing the intuitively unsavory 
(if not conceptually untenable) view that a maximally or infinitely Holy 
Being ordains or intends the existence of evil or undeserved suffering. I 
know of no theodicy presently on the books that has dealt (or is able to 
deal) in a more metaphysically satisfying way with the "Manicheanism-
vs. -Divine Sovereignty" problem concerning the ultimate provenance of 
evil. Accordingly, when this virtue of the theodicy under discussion is 
coupled with its considerable explanatory power vis-a-vis the existence of 
unmerited suffering, it is hard to resist the conclusion that the doctrine of 
Tzimizum-properly interpreted, of course-has much to recommend it as 
the nucleus of an eminently respectable theodicy. 
VIII 
By way of postscript, I want to deal briefly with an ostensible conun-
drum for our theodicy which may appear to undermine or mitigate the 
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case for its plausibility. Consider: central to Judaism (as well, of course, 
as to Christianity) is the doctrine that there is eventually destined to 
occur on the world's stage a messianic consummation of history. The 
presumably outstanding feature of this long-anticipated time or era is 
that there will be an unambiguous triumph of good over evil: that evil 
will be defeated. 2' Accordingly, evil would then constitute-along with 
dinosaurs and the Ice Age, etc.-a "thing of the past." The putative 
dilemma, however, is this: how could evil ever be defeated, if, as would 
seem to be implied by the theodicy which has been elaborated and 
defended, it "comes with the territory;" i.e., if, to cite once again the 
words of Gershom Scholem, "the root of evil ... lies in the very nature of 
Creation itself ... "? Alternatively, how could evil ever be defeated if, by 
virtue of the Divine 'Tzimzum or Hester Panim that is necessary to pre-
vent the annihilation or nullification of the finite by God's Infinite 
Radiance, it constitutes an inherent or structural defect of the finite? 
First off, it would be well to note that the doctrine of the Messiah 
would seem to be one of those tenets of Judeo-Christian belief which are 
not readily amenable to rational vindication. Nonetheless, I think that we 
can get enough of a conceptual grip on the question to provide the bare 
bones of a promising argument for concluding that the view that evil will 
eventually be defeated can properly be regarded as consistent with the 
theodicy under discussion. Consider: A long-standing tenet of the Jewish 
(and also, I believe, of the Christian) faith is that, through the perfor-
mance of Godly or holy actions (kindness, charity, mercy, etc.)-actions 
which instantiate the concept of Imitatio Dei-more of God's Radiance or 
Holiness is brought into the world: perhaps more perspicuously, God's 
Radiance or Holiness is made more manifest in the world. Hence, the 
degree to which God's Light becomes manifest in the world turns out to 
depend in no small way upon the actions of human persons. (This should 
not be taken to imply, incidentally, that Godly behavior by humans can 
long be sustained or deepened independently of some Divine assistance 
or Grace.) Note, however, that any increase in the degree to which God's 
Radiance is manifested or revealed within Creation necessarily involves 
(indeed, is tantamount to) a lessening of Hester Panim or Tzimzum; i.e., a 
diminishment in God's concealment of His Infinite Radiance. 
Accordingly, each bit of Godly behavior that we perform, by virtue of 
allowing more and more of God's Light or Radiance into the world-and 
thus reducing the level of Divine Tzimizum-serves to raise (in what may 
well be a painfully slow or incremental manner) our tolerance threshold 
for God's Radiance. (Consider this analogy: Susan needs to take a certain 
powerful medication in rather large doses if she is to have a complete 
recovery from her illness. At first, she was able to tolerate only very small 
doses. However, by increasing her dosage just a little at a time, she is 
now able to tolerate the very high doses that she needs.) However, any 
lessening of Tzimzum-any increase in the extent to which God's Light or 
Radiance is manifested or revealed in Creation-can only serve to bind 
us more closely to the Source of that Holiness. Which, in turn, can plausi-
bly be expected to reinforce and thus promote Godly behavior; but that, 
of course, means a further lessening of Tzimzum-which, in turn, pro-
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motes yet more Godly behavior, and so on ... Accordingly, this cycle of 
mutual reinforcement between Godly behavior and the diminishing of 
Tzimzum strongly suggests that there is nothing conceptually disordered 
about the notion that mankind will finally achieve a sufficient level of 
spiritual maturity or stength (though the twentieth-century, of course, 
has hardly been encouraging in this regard) not to be obliterated by a 
revelation of the degree of Divine Radiance that it takes to defeat evil. 
Hence, our theodicy should not be taken to entail that evil constitutes an 
absolutely ineradicable structural defect of our world; i.e., to entail that evil 
is logically undefeatable. Accordingly, the long-standing Judeo-Christian 
tenet that evil will ultimately be defeated in a messianic consumption of 
history fails to constitute a conceptual obstacle to the plausibility of our 
theodicy.28 
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